## SCALLOP: scaling the CSI-FiSh

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# Cryptographic group actions

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A group action of a group G on a set X is a function

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- Vectorization prob.: given  $x, y \in X$ , find  $g \in G$  s.t.  $y = g \star x$
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- Parallelization prob.: given  $x, g \star x, h \star x$ , find  $(gh) \star x$
- Candidates for post-quantum Diffie-Hellman key exchange, e.g. reasonably efficient isogeny-based scheme CSIDH (NIKE)
   SCALLOP: a new isogeny-based group action

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### Solution:

- Restrict group action to list of elements l<sub>1</sub>,..., l<sub>n</sub> spanning G such that l<sub>i</sub> \* E can be efficiently evaluated for every E
- Can evaluate action  $\prod_i l_i^{e_i} \star E$  efficiently as long as exponents  $(e_1, \ldots, e_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$  are sufficiently small
- $\Rightarrow$  <u>Restricted</u> effective group action (REGA)

## General strategy: REGA to EGA

Precomputation done once:

- Compute cardinality of acting group |G|
- Compute lattice of relations L of l<sub>i</sub>, i.e. lattice spanned by vectors (e<sub>1</sub>,..., e<sub>n</sub>) such that ∏<sub>i</sub> l<sup>e<sub>i</sub></sup><sub>i</sub> ∈ Z acts trivially on set X
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Online phase to evaluate  $l_1^e \star E$  (for all  $e \in \mathbb{Z}$ ):

Solve (approximate) CVP of (e, 0, ..., 0) in L to find decomposition l<sup>e</sup><sub>1</sub> = ∏<sub>i</sub> l<sup>e<sub>i</sub></sup><sub>i</sub> with small exponents e<sub>i</sub>

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## Caution

Depending on the group G, the precomputation might be computationally infeasible!

# CSI-FiSh signature scheme [BKV19]

- Based on group action of CSIDH-512
- Precompute *lattice of relations* L for the generators used in CSIDH-512 using an index-calculus approach
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### Motivation

Introduce group action that solves the scaling issue of CSI-FiSh (to some extent..)

## Group actions on oriented curves

- Let  $\mathfrak{O}$  be an imaginary quadratic order, e.g.  $\mathbb{Z}[\sqrt{-p}]$
- Let X be the set of supersingular elliptic curves up to isomorphism such that D embeds into their endomorphism ring
- Invertible ideals of D act on X, principal ideals act trivially,
  i.e. group action by class group Cl(D)

 $\mathsf{Cl}(\mathfrak{O}) \times X \to X$ 

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Can we use different  $\mathfrak{O}$ ?

How to represent and compute with different orientation?

- $\blacksquare$  Take  $\mathfrak{O}_0$  with  $|\mathsf{Cl}(\mathfrak{O}_0)|=1$
- $\blacksquare$  Generate candidates for  $\mathfrak O$  with smooth generator until
  - conductor f is prime (avoids factoring f)
  - class number |Cl(D)| is reasonably smooth (asymptotically, L<sub>f</sub>(1/2) search for L<sub>f</sub>(1/2)-smooth |Cl(D)|)

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- Compute lattice of relations L by solving instances of discrete logarithm problem in Cl(D)
- Compute reduced basis of  $\mathcal{L}$  using BKZ as in CSI-FiSh
- Generate a starting curve with  $\mathfrak{O}$ -orientation

# SCALLOP: Online phase

- Generator of smooth norm of O corresponds to endomorphism ω<sub>E</sub>
   of smooth degree which we
   represented by kernels of two
   isogenies
- ω<sub>E</sub> stabilizes kernels of isogenies used to compute group action




Figure: Isogeny volcano for  $\mathfrak{O}$ -oriented curves in SCALLOP.

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   represented by kernels of two
   isogenies
- ω<sub>E</sub> stabilizes kernels of isogenies used to compute group action
- Evaluate group action by transporting explicit orientation along the group action
- Computing explicit orientation leads to slowdown compared to CSI-FiSh with canonical orientation




Figure: Isogeny volcano for  $\mathcal{D}$ -oriented curves in SCALLOP.

## Effective Group Actions: CSI-FiSh vs SCALLOP

#### CSI-FiSh

## <u>SCALLOP</u>

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$$\mathfrak{O} = \mathbb{Z}[\sqrt{-p}]$$

• 
$$\mathfrak{O} = \mathbb{Z} + f \mathfrak{O}_0$$
,  $f$  prime

# Effective Group Actions: CSI-FiSh vs SCALLOP

### CSI-FiSh

- $\bullet \mathfrak{O} = \mathbb{Z}[\sqrt{-p}]$
- Expensive class group computation, only feasible for CSIDH-512 parameters

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- |Cl(D)| free, sieve until smooth enough to compute lattice of relations

# Effective Group Actions: CSI-FiSh vs SCALLOP

### CSI-FiSh

- $\mathfrak{O} = \mathbb{Z}[\sqrt{-p}]$
- Expensive class group computation, only feasible for CSIDH-512 parameters
- Evaluation of group action with implicit orientation
- Online phase fast

## <u>SCALLOP</u>

- $\mathfrak{O} = \mathbb{Z} + f \mathfrak{O}_0$ , f prime
- |Cl(D)| free, sieve until smooth enough to compute lattice of relations
- Need to compute explicit orientation along group action
- Online phase slower, but feasible for larger security levels

Proof of concept implementation in C++ available at: https://github.com/isogeny-scallop/scallop

- Concrete instantiation for SCALLOP matching the security levels of CSIDH-512 and CSIDH-1024
- Public keys of size roughly 1600bits for SCALLOP-512 and 2300bits for SCALLOP-1024

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- Concrete instantiation for SCALLOP matching the security levels of CSIDH-512 and CSIDH-1024
- Public keys of size roughly 1600bits for SCALLOP-512 and 2300bits for SCALLOP-1024
- Evaluation of the group action takes about 35 seconds for the smaller and 12.5 minutes for the larger parameter set
- Implementation shows feasibility, but further work needed to make the group action practical

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- Concrete instantiations of class group action using action of class group of imaginary quadratic order with large prime conductor *f* inside an imaginary quadratic field of small discriminant (SCALLOP)
- This instantiates effective group actions for security levels previously out of reach
- Can build schemes that require to uniquely represent and efficiently act by *arbitrary* group elements for larger security levels than with CSIDH group action

# Questions

## Open

- How to make group action evaluation more practical?
- How to resolve the scaling issues of SCALLOP?

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More details: ia.cr/2023/058

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